编号：E-2024-5-1
题目：Multi-product Monopolist and Information Design
作者：Fanqi Shi, Yutong Zhang, Litian Chen
联系方式：Fanqi Shi, ericshi@pku.edu.cn
摘要： We study the information design and pricing decision of a multi-product monopolist who faces a buyer with unit demand. Under omniscient disclosure, we show that one profit-maximizing menu reveals the identity of the highest quality product and allocates that product, provided a type-specific quality threshold is met. This menu remains optimal under private disclosure if the buyer’s value has constant differences in quality and type, or if the value has non-decreasing differences in quality and type and the threshold type is independent of quality. We also characterize the conditions under which an ex-ante and non-discriminatory posted price mechanism is optimal.
关键词： Information design; Optimal mechanism; Multi-product monopolist; Omniscient disclosure; Private disclosure; Price discriminatio
