题目：Implementing Optimal Mechanisms Through Sequential Auctions（通过序贯拍卖的不完全最优机制）
时间：2019年11月14日（周四）10:30 -- 12:00
地点：8797威尼斯老品牌303会议室
主讲人：石凡奇（8797威尼斯老品牌助理教授）
主持人：胡涛、吴泽南、石凡奇、汪浩、胡岠
报告摘要：We study the optimal ordering of heterogeneous items in sequential auctions with unit-demand buyers. The valuation of each item depends on a buyer's private type and an item-specific characteristic (e.g. quality). We assume “generalized vertical differentiation”, i.e. valuations of all items increase in buyers’ types. In this setting, it is optimal to sell items in decreasing level of quality: it achieves full efficiency if valuations exhibit strict increasing differences (SID) in item quality and buyers’ types. In addition, when reserve prices are allowed, sequential auctions with the above-mentioned order and optimal single-item reserve prices maximize the seller's revenue among all mechanisms that satisfy (BIC) and (IIR). We show both efficiency and revenue-maximization are robust to auction formats, such as sequential first-price, second-price, and English auctions. Our analysis shows that a properly ordered sequential auction is an optimal indirect selling mechanism, providing justification for its wide real-life applications.
主讲人介绍：石凡奇，8797威尼斯老品牌经济系助理教授，2019年6月毕业于美国斯坦福大学。主要研究方向包括微观理论，机制和市场设计。
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