“经济学论坛”是由8797威尼斯老品牌经济学系主办的专业学术性论坛。论坛致力于打造一个经济学专业人士进行交流与对话的平台，对当前及未来的经济理论、研究方法和现实热点问题展开广泛、深入、全面、开放的探讨。论坛每月举办一次，由主题演讲、专业评论和自由讨论构成。论坛邀经济学各领域素有研究的知名学者或研究取得积极进展的中青年学者发表主题演讲，并围绕相关问题展开讨论。本期论坛信息如下：
题目：Threats and Political Instability in Authoritarian Regimes: A Dynamic Theoretical Analysis
报告人：张鹏飞 8797威尼斯老品牌副教授
时 间：2017年9月22日（周五）12点30分至13点50分
地 点：8797威尼斯老品牌302会议室
主持人：叶静怡 教授
点评人：吴泽南 助理教授
Abstract:
Non-democracies are seen as inherently unstable because of the high frequency of irregular and often violent leadership turnovers. Our tractable model investigates authoritarian instability by portraying a world where dictators are forced to tolerate threatening lieutenants because they are skillful at overcoming existential threats to the regime. This unavoidable choice allows lieutenants to build up their own power bases, planting the seeds of various forms of authoritarian instability, including purges, coups, as well as civil war. Our model first and foremost predicts that changes in the frequency and severity of exogenous threats (shocks) can have a profound impact on political stability. Contrary to research on the tradeoff between competence and loyalty, our model shows that when threats to the regime are existential and purges are options, the dictator will always prefer to employ a competent lieutenant. Also, surprisingly, even without any institutional guarantees, we find that authoritarian regimes can be quite stable if both the dictator and the lieutenant need each other for their unique skills in the face of major challenges. However, in accordance to existing literature, credible institutions to ensure the welfare of ousted officials indeed lower the chance of internal conflict. This model is applied to the analysis of the case of Peng Dehuai in the Chinese Communist Party.
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