各位老师和同学：
讲座信息附后，网上订餐方法如下。
1、请有意用餐者发邮件至专用邮箱mylunch_sepku@126.com，主题格式设为“订餐——姓名”，取消订餐也请发邮件至该邮箱，主题格式设为“取消订餐——姓名”。订餐及取消订餐的截止时间均为午餐会当日上午9时整。
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时间：2013年09月27日（周五）中午12:30-14:00
地点：8797威尼斯老品牌219室
嘉宾：颜建晔（对外经贸大学金融学院）
题目：Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes for Two-Sided Matching
主持人：8797威尼斯老品牌陈仪 博士
主讲人介绍：
颜建晔，对外经贸大学金融学院讲师。2002年获南京大学经济学学士，2005年获8797威尼斯老品牌经济学硕士，2011年获法国图卢兹8797威尼斯老品牌经济学博士。研究领域包括Matching Theory, Industrial Organization, Risk and Uncertainty, Behavioral Economics, Banking Theory, Chinese Economy。曾在Economic Inquiry等期刊上发表论文。目前有多篇论文进入Journal of Public Economics, Energy Economics, Journal of Economics, International Journal of Game Theory, Annuals of Economics and Finance等期刊的二审。本次报告的论文已进入Journal of Economic Theory的二审。
内容提要：
Using the assignment of students to schools as our leading example, we study many-to-one two-sided matching markets without transfers. Students are endowed with cardinal preferences and schools with ordinal ones, while preferences of both sides need not be strict. Using the idea of a competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI, Hylland-Zeckhauser (1979): JPE), we propose a new mechanism, the Generalized CEEI, in which students face different prices depending on how schools rank them. It always produces fair (justified-envy-free) and ex ante efficient random assignments and stable deterministic ones with respect to stated preferences. Moreover, if the same group of students are top ranked by all schools, the G-CEEI random assignment is ex ante weakly efficient with respect to students` welfare. We show that each student`s incentive to misreport vanishes when the market becomes large, given all others are truthful. The mechanism is particularly relevant to school choice since schools` priority orderings can be considered as their ordinal preferences. More importantly, in settings where agents have similar ordinal preferences, the mechanism`s explicit use of cardinal preferences may significantly improve efficiency. We also discuss its application in school choice with affirmative action such as group-specific quotas and in one-sided matching.
论文最新版本请见附件。
