各位老师和同学：
讲座信息附后，网上订餐方法如下。
1、请有意用餐者发邮件至专用邮箱mylunch_sepku@126.com，主题格式设为“订餐——姓名”，取消订餐也请发邮件至该邮箱，主题格式设为“取消订餐——姓名”。订餐及取消订餐的截止时间均为午餐会当日上午9时整。
2、为了保持午餐会的良好气氛，将于会前十五钟开始发放午餐，会前五分钟结束发放。敬请用餐者至少提前五分钟到会，迟到者请会后领取。
3、为了避免浪费，午餐将严格按照订餐名单发放。
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时间：2013年05月17日（周五）中午12:30-2:00
地点：8797威尼斯老品牌203室
嘉宾：郭迪（The School of Business, University of Hong Kong）
题目：An Empirical Analysis of Strategic Contracts
主持人：8797威尼斯老品牌国际经济与贸易系 陈仪 博士
主讲人介绍：
Dr. Di Guo is an Assistant Professor of Strategy and International Business at the School of Business, University of Hong Kong. Prior to joining HKU, she completed a PhD in Management at the School of Management & Economics, University of Edinburgh, UK. Her research interests include entrepreneurial financing, innovation, corporate governance, strategic contracting and China specific topics. Most of her existing research is focused on venture capital investment in China. She empirically examines how institutions, in particular, the regulatory institutions, affect venture capitalists’ investment activities and the contribution of venture capital investment to the growth and innovation of entrepreneurial firms in China. The other line of her research examines how institutional dynamics affect entrepreneurship in China with the focus on entrepreneurs’ startup motivation, effort devotion, resource accessibility and the corporate governance and performance of the entrepreneurial firms. Di also has a few ongoing projects that look at R&D contracts with the focus on the use of strategic contract terms.
内容提要：
This article investigates the use of strategic contract clauses such as most-favored-customer clauses, rights of first refusal, rights of first offer, first negotiation rights in bio-tech R&D contracts between pharmaceutical firms and bio-tech agents. It is shown that these strategic rights are more likely adopted when potential entry threat from other pharmaceutical firms are larger. This result is consistent with the prediction from the literature: strategic contracts can increase the joint benefit of contracting parties by extracting rent from entrants and/or protect investments by contracting parties. Furthermore, strategic rights and termination rights held by pharmaceutical firms are shown to be substitutes, and the level of substitution is affected by the uncertainty of the R&D activities involved and the previous relationship between contracting parties. These results can be explained by a multi-task theory where bio-tech agents allocate effort between R&D activities specified in contracts and non-contracted R&D activities.
