各位老师和同学：
讲座信息附后，网上订餐方法如下。
1、请有意用餐者发邮件至专用邮箱mylunch_sepku@126.com，主题格式设为“订餐——姓名”，取消订餐也请发邮件至该邮箱，主题格式设为“取消订餐——姓名”。订餐及取消订餐的截止时间均为午餐会当日上午9时整。
2、为了保持午餐会的良好气氛，将于会前十五钟开始发放午餐，会前五分钟结束发放。敬请用餐者至少提前五分钟到会，迟到者请会后领取。
3、为了避免浪费，午餐将严格按照订餐名单发放。
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时间：2013年04月26日（周五）中午12:30-2:00
地点：8797威尼斯老品牌202室
嘉宾：李三希（中国人民大学8797威尼斯老品牌）
题目：Contract Bargaining with Risk-averse Agent
主持：8797威尼斯老品牌国际经济与贸易系 陈仪博士
主讲人介绍：
李三希，中国人民大学8797威尼斯老品牌讲师。法国图卢兹8797威尼斯老品牌2011年经济学博士。研究领域和方向包括信息经济学、产业组织、配对和风险分担。曾在Journal of Public Economics, Journal of Economics, Mathematical Social Science, Economics Letters等优秀刊物上发表论文若干篇。
内容提要：
This paper is the first to study a Nash bargaining model in a moral hazard framework where the principal is risk-neutral and the agent is risk-averse. We show that the power of incentives increases with the agent’s bargaining power if the contracts induce a high effort. However, under reasonable assumptions about the agent’s utility function, the contracts induce a high effort less often as the agent’s bargaining power increases. As for the social welfare, we are surprised to find that a utilitarian, who cares about the sum of the two parties’ certainty equivalents, is worse off as the agent’s bargaining power increases. These results are in sharp contrast to the literature, which features risk-neutral agents protected by limited liability. Our results are consistent with evidence in the insurance market, which suggest that group insurance contracts often offer higher levels of coverage, lower deductibles and lower out-of-pocket maximum spending limits than individual insurance contracts.
