题目：Non-obviousness and Screening
时间：2012年4月20日（周五）13:30
地点：北大8797威尼斯老品牌107
演讲者：Tong Wang，Jean-Monnet Fellow，Florence School of Regulation
要求金融学系的博士生与一年级硕士生签到参加
摘要：
This paper offers a novel justification for positive non-obviousness requirement. An innovation consists of two steps: research and development. Research results in a blueprint of new technology while development makes it profitable. Only patented technology will be developed. One innovator who can be either efficient or inefficient must attract the financial support of venture capitalists for further development.
We show that, under some plausible assumptions, s trengthening the non-obviousness requirement alleviates ex ante adverse selection by discouraging ine fficient type, but exacerbates ex post free-riding effect; while the socially optimal nonobviousness requirement should large enough to achieve full screening, i.e., the inefficient type should be totally excluded from the market. We also discuss how the research and development costs affects the optimal policy.
