主讲人：
Hanming Fang (University of Pennsylvania)
时间：
2021年4月22日（周四）10:00-11:30
主持老师：
（北大经院）吴泽南、石凡奇
（北大国发院）胡岠
参与老师：
（北大经院）胡涛、吴泽南、石凡奇
（北大国发院）汪浩、胡岠
作者：
Hanming Fang, Xiao Qin, Wenfeng Wu, and Tong Yu
形式：
zoom会议
会议号：963 7895 5301
密码：941315
主讲人简介：
Hanming Fang is Joseph M. Cohen Term Professor of Economics at the University of Pennsylvania. He is an applied microeconomist with broad theoretical and empirical interests focusing on public economics. His research covers topics ranging from discrimination, social economics, psychology and economics, and welfare reform to public good provision mechanisms, auctions, health insurance markets, and population aging. He has been a co-editor for leading economics journals, including the Journal of Public Economics and the International Economic Review, and has served on the editorial board for numerous journals. He currently serves as a senior editor for the Journal of Risk and Insurance, and is on the editorial committee of Annual Review of Economics (2020-2024). He was elected as a Fellow of the Econometric Society in 2018. He has published numerous articles in leading economics journals, such as American Economic Review, Journal of Political Economy, Journal of Economic Theory, Review of Economics and Statistics, Economic Journal, Journal of Public Economics, RAND Journal of Economics, and International Economic Review.
摘要：
Xiang Hu Bao (XHB), meaning “mutual protection” in Chinese, is a novel online platform operated by Alibaba’s Ant Financial to facilitate mutual risk sharing of critical illness exposures. XHB reached nearly 100 million members in less than one year since its launch and so far has offered its members critical illness protections at significantly lower cost than traditional critical illness insurance. There are three major distinctions between XHB and traditional insurance products. First, XHB leverages the tech giant’s platform and digital technology to lower enrollment and claim processing costs. Second, different from insurance applying sophisticated actuarial pricing models, XHB collects no premiums ex ante from members, but instead equally allocates indemnities and administrative costs among participants after each claims period. Third, XHB limits coverage amount, often below critical illness insurance products, particularly for older participants. We show this restriction potentially leads to separating equilibrium, a la Rothschild-Stiglitz, where low-risk individuals enroll in XHB while high-risk individuals purchase critical illness insurance. Proprietary data from XHB shows that the incidence rate of the covered illness among XHB members is well below that of comparable critical illness insurance. Our findings further suggest the role of advantageous selection in explaining the cost advantages of the Fintech-based mutual protection programs.
