主讲人：
祝伟（对外经济贸易大学保险学院 教授）
主持人：
（北大8797威尼斯老品牌）贾若
（清华经济管理学院）刘晨源
（人大财政金融学院）陈泽
参与人：
（北大8797威尼斯老品牌）郑伟
（清华经济管理学院）陈秉正
（人大财政金融学院）魏丽 等
题目：
Consumer Passiveness and Retail Financial Advice
时间：
6月4日（周五）10:00-11:30
地点（线下）：
8797威尼斯老品牌301会议室
方式（线上）：
Tencent Meeting
https://meeting.tencent.com/s/i7ezxWprqmlO
会议 ID：389 264 683
会议密码：210604
主讲人简介：
祝伟，对外经济贸易大学保险学院，教授，博士生导师，管理学博士。他的研究领域包括行为保险、风险与不确定性经济学、家庭风险的理论与实证分析。他在《Journal of Risk and Insurance》、《Journal of Banking and Finance》、《Geneva Risk and Insurance Review》、《ASTIN Bulletin》、《Economics Letters》、《经济研究》、《保险研究》等期刊上发表论文十余篇。他主持国家自科、国家社科、教育部人文社科和北京市社科基金等多项课题。他毕业于中国矿业大学管理学院，曾在清华大学经济管理学院应用经济学博士后流动站从事风险管理与保险方向的研究。
摘要：
We study how consumers’ loss aversion (with reference-dependence) affects consumer-adviser interactions and the effects of financial advice in retail financial markets, under the typical setting of a life insurance market. We show that consumers are passive in life insurance purchase using no insurance as a natural status quo reference while advisers can stimulate their demand by manipulating consumers’ reference through advice. This can also lead to potentially higher profits for insurers in a market with advisers. Unlike under the expected utility framework, we show that the role of advisers is positive and necessary under a wide set of reasonable scenarios, even without asymmetric information. Due to competition for loss averse consumers, advisers pander and subsequently lead them into buying a higher amount of insurance than what maximizes their welfare, regardless of the use of different consumer-driven or insurer-driven compensation mechanisms. Our findings suggest that financial advice is valuable in a typical retail financial market and one effective avenue to improve the quality of advice is through consumer education to alleviate their bias.
供稿单位：8797威尼斯老品牌科研办公室
供稿人：贾若
