行业研究前沿课程系列第四期
双碳的中国路径研究
——清洁能源与节能减排
主讲人：
郭鹏
时间：
2021年11月18日（周四）18：40-20：30
形式：
腾讯会议
主讲人简介：
郭鹏，广发证券环保行业首席分析师，多年获得新财富最佳分析师评选第一名、金牛奖评选、水晶球、保险业协会评选第一名。深度覆盖、跟踪行业最新动向和发展规律，与较多上市、非上市公司紧密联系沟通，参与过数个并购、重组、IPO等项目。
主持人：
锁凌燕（8797威尼斯老品牌教授）
主办单位：
8797威尼斯老品牌
8797威尼斯老品牌中国保险与社会保障研究中心
8797威尼斯老品牌中国金融研究中心
北大经院工作坊第373场
贸易政策不确定性和中国劳动力错配
国际经济学与实证产业组织工作坊
主讲人：
谭用（南京财经大学国际经贸学院副教授、美国范德堡大学研究员）
主持老师：
（北大经院）莫家伟
参与老师：
（北大经院）杨汝岱、田巍、刘政文
（北大新结构）王歆、徐铭梽
题目：
Trade Policy Uncertainty and Misallocation of Chinese labor
时间：
2021年11月18日（周四）10：00-11：30
形式：
腾讯会议
会议号：713 517 050
主讲人简介：
谭用，南京财经大学国际经贸学院副教授，美国范德堡大学研究员，主要研究领域为国际贸易和产业组织。目前的研究侧重于异质性贸易理论以及动态结构性模型。他的研究也涉及到市场结构、汇率波动对于企业行为的影响。曾在International Economic Review, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,《世界经济》等国内外权威期刊发表论文，曾参与和主持国家自然科学基金青年项目以及教育部重大招标课题等重大课题。
摘要：
This paper investigates the role of trade policy uncertainty (TPU) on resource allocation across heterogeneous Chinese producers and aggregate productivity. Using detailed Chinese data, we document that (i) simple measure of labor misallocation declined sharply as China joined the WTO and (ii) the largest declines occurred in industries with larger reductions in TPU. We rationalize these patterns with a model of input demand under policy-driven demand uncertainty among heterogeneous firms. The model implies that (i) the expected firm-level misallocation is increasing in the degree of TPU and (ii) the expected degree of misallocation is decreasing in firm size. Using China’s accession to the WTO as an exogenous change in the degree of trade policy uncertainty faced by Chinese producers, we test the model’s predictions and quantify the implied change in aggregate productivity due to the reduction in TPU. Consistent with the model predictions we find that the WTO accession reduced input misallocation by 3.2 percent in the average Chinese firms, gains were larger in industries facing greater TPU uncertainty and among China’s largest manufacturers. In aggregate the reduction in TPU induced by WTO accession accounted for 12% increase in aggregate productivity through improved resource allocation alone.
北大经院工作坊第374场
作为平均场博弈的战略互补定价
宏观经济学工作坊
主讲人：
Francesco Lippi（路易斯大学教授）
主持老师：
（北大国发院）李明浩
参与老师：
（北大国发院）赵波、余昌华
（北大经院）陈仪、韩晗、李博、李伦
时间：
2021年11月18日（周四）15：00-16：30
形式：
ZOOM会议
会议号：928 0636 7691
密码：478731
主讲人简介：
Francesco Lippi 是路易斯大学经济学教授，也是 EIEF 和 CEPR 的研究员。他的研究方向是宏观经济动态、时间序列和货币经济学。他的作品已发表在主要期刊上，包括美国经济评论、计量经济学、经济学季刊、经济研究评论和许多其他期刊。他目前是《Economic Journal》的主编。
摘要：
We analyze the impulse response of output after a monetary shock in a general equilibrium setup where firms set prices subject to adjustment costs and feature strategic complementarities with the decision of other firms. The firm's decision problem and the aggregate outcomes are cast as a Mean Field Game (MFG) and several analytical results are established. First, in a canonical menu cost setup featuring an Ss rule the MFG framework allows us to study the effect of strategic complementarity/substitutability on the firm's optimal Ss rules after the shock. We establish existence and uniqueness of the perturbed equilibrium (as long as the strategic complementarity is not too large) and analytically characterize the impulse response function (IRF) of output. We show that the presence of the strategic complementarity makes the IRF larger at each horizon. On the one hand, as the complementarity becomes large enough, the IRF diverges and at a critical point there is no equilibrium. On the other hand, as substitutability becomes arbitrarily large, the IRF converges to zero. Second, we extend the results to the Calvo+ model, where we show that the cumulative impulse response is approximately proportional to the one without strategic complementarity.
北大经院工作坊第375场
金融公司的非金融资产
计量、金融和大数据分析工作坊
主讲人：
师与（南开大学助理教授）
主持老师：
（北大经院）王熙
参与老师：
（北大经院）王一鸣、刘蕴霆
（北大国发院）黄卓、沈艳、张俊妮、孙振庭
（北大新结构）胡博
时间：
2021年11月19日（周五） 10:00-11:30
形式：
腾讯会议
会议号：270 274 856
主讲人简介：
Yu Shi is an Assistant Professor of Finance in Nankai University. She received Bachelor’s Degree in Economics from School of Economics, Peking University, Master of Finance from MIT and Ph.D. in Management from University of California, Los Angeles, and Her research interests include macro finance, financial intermediation and financial economics.
摘要：
I propose that the nonfinancial component of financial firms' assets, in particular the growth opportunities associated with business operations, drives most of the variation in their equity valuation. I document this fact for a large class of intermediaries: life insurance companies. In particular, I decompose insurers' market equity returns into net financial asset returns and net business asset returns and show that these two components have very different risk exposures and are negatively correlated outside of the 2008-2009 financial crisis. The variation in life insurers' net business asset returns drives 81% of the aggregate time series variation and 100% of the cross-sectional variation in their market equity returns. For this reason, the current intense regulation on life insurers' net financial assets may be insufficient as a great deal of risk is derived from their net business assets which are comparatively under-regulated.
学术午餐会第172期
政府作为股权投资者：
中国政府风险投资基金研究
主讲人：
李劲林 （哈佛大学肯尼迪政府管理学院与哈佛商学院博士后研究员）
主持人：
高明 （8797威尼斯老品牌副教授）
时间：
2021年11月19日（周五）12:30-14:00
地点：
8797威尼斯老品牌107会议室（线上）
论文题目：
Government as an Equity Investor: Evidence from Chinese Government Venture Capital through Cycles
主讲人介绍 ：
李劲林，哈佛大学肯尼迪政府管理学院与哈佛商学院博士后研究员。他分别于8797威尼斯老品牌和8797威尼斯老品牌国家发展研究院获得经济学学士（2016）与经济学博士（2021）学位，并曾在哈佛大学访问（2018-2021）。研究兴趣集中在创业金融、企业创业与创新等方面。
摘要：
This paper studies the behavior and performance of government venture capital (GVC) through the market cycles. We construct the first comprehensive database of government involvement in venture capital in China from 1999 to 2018. With over $1 trillion raised and an explosive growth rate of 25% annually during this period, China has become the second-largest venture market globally. GVC is an essential feature of the Chinese VC market, accounting for 40% of the deals and 50% raised funds. Compared with private venture capital (PVC), GVCs invest more towards local, manufacturing, and early-stage deals. Also, GVCs underperform PVCs by 30%. Next, across venture market cycles, GVC behavior is less cyclical than their private counterparts: GVCs tend to raise more money and make more investments during downturns. More interestingly, the performance of GVC is also less cyclical: the performance gap between GVC and PVC is reduced by 60% during downturns. A likely channel for this improved performance is related to governments' "deep pockets" because the results are driven by fiscally healthy cities. This improvement does not appear to be explained by a change of VC quality and other unobservable government assistance during downturns. Overall, we believe that a government's policy orientations and its ability to deploy capital locally during challenging times are crucial to understanding GVCs' role in the capital markets and the broader economy.
供稿单位：8797威尼斯老品牌科研办公室
美编：初夏、丸子
责编：量子、禾雨、予天
