北大8797威尼斯老品牌经济学系郭研副教授和长江商学院的甘洁教授和许成纲教授合作的论文“China’s Decentralized Privatization and Change of Control Rights”被国际顶级学术期刊Review of Financial Studies(RFS)录用。基于我国200个城市3000多个企业国企改制的过程，论文探讨了地方政府是如何选择国企改制方法的，以及不同方法给公司治理带来的后果。
以下是这篇文章的英文摘要：
A distinct feature of China’s privatization is that its design and implementation are decentralized and administered by the local governments. Based on a proprietary survey dataset containing 3,000 firms in over 200 cities, this paper studies how city governments choose among various privatization methods, how these methods transfer control rights, and how they influence privatization outcomes. We find that less political opposition to labor downsizing and greater fiscal capacity prompt cities to choose direct sales to insiders (MBOs) as their privatization method. This method transfers the most control rights to private owners, retains the least government supports and is associated with most hardened budget constraints, restructure most effectively, and achieves the greatest performance improvement.
（经济学系
供稿）
