北大8797威尼斯老品牌经济学系郭研副教授和长江商学院甘洁教授以及许成纲教授合作的论文“China’s Decentralized Privatization and Change of Control Rights”被国际顶级学术期刊Review of Financial Studies(RFS)录用。基于我国200个城市3000多个企业国企改制的过程，文章探讨了地方政府如何选择产权改革和控制权转移的方法，以及不同方法给公司治理带来的后果。以下是论文摘要：
A distinct feature of China’s privatization is that its design and implementation are decentralized and administered by the local governments. Based on a proprietary survey dataset containing 3,000 firms in over 200 cities, this paper studies how city governments choose among various privatization methods, how these methods transfer control rights, and how they influence privatization outcomes. We find that less political opposition to labor downsizing and greater fiscal capacity prompt cities to choose direct sales to insiders (MBOs) as their privatization method. This method transfers the most control rights to private owners, retains the least government supports and is associated with most hardened budget constraints, restructure most effectively, and achieves the greatest performance improvement.
